





















Developing countries face an increasing need to upgrade the standards of their domestic 
markets and of their exports. This paper examines different approaches available to them 
for upgrading their standards and conformity assessment procedures.  It focuses 
particularly on those followed within the context of regional trade agreements (RTAs), as 
these are yielding promising results.  Based on interviews performed in Latin America 
and on previous literature, the paper draws common features of a RTA standard and 
conformity assessment upgrading and harmonization process, identifies some of its main 
challenges and suggests principles that developing countries could follow in such a 
process. 
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 “The real 21
st century trade issues are standards and rules in areas such as safety, 







Developing countries are experiencing an increasing need to upgrade standards in their 
domestic and export markets.  The need for higher standards requirements in their 
domestic market is caused by the surge in imports to developing countries resulting from 
their greater liberalization.  This surge is raising developing countries’ concern about 
ensuring that imported products are safe for consumers and the environment.  Such is the 
case for instance in Peru, which is experiencing a great influx of low quality Chinese 
manufactured goods.  The need for higher export standards originates from the rising 
standards requirements in developed countries’ markets.   
 
This paper examines different approaches available to developing countries in upgrading 
their standards and conformity assessment procedures, focusing particularly on 
approaches followed within the context of regional trade agreements (RTAs), as these are 
yielding promising results.  Based on RTAs’ upgrading experiences, the paper makes 
suggestions for a more effective upgrading implementation process. 
 
There are different paths available to upgrade standards.  Upgrading standards 
unilaterally to international levels is the simplest process, but can prove costly for 
countries in a low development stage.  The cost these countries must incur to readjust 
their production and regulatory structures to meet international standards is significant, 
yet the returns are not always ensured since the satisfaction of international standards 
does not guarantee market access.  If the upgrading is not coordinated with trading 
partners, the upgrade might not be high enough to meet partners’ new standards and 
conformity assessment requirements.  To minimize this problem many countries have 
upgraded their standards following a coordinated harmonization process with other 
trading partners.  
 
The type of coordinated path that a country can follow depends on the institutional 
sophistication of the trade agreement that the country has with the partners with which it 
is coordinating its upgrading.  Two distinct coordinated approaches are the cooperation 
approach and the RTA approach.  The cooperation approach is that followed by bilateral 
trade agreements and by multilateral cooperative agreements, like APEC.  It has less 
enforcement power than an RTA approach, and can therefore encounter greater obstacles 
if some members are not fully committed to the upgrading process.  An RTA approach is 
that followed by the members of an RTA and it involves not only the upgrading of 
standards, but also the regional harmonization of standards.   
 
Two types of RTA approaches to standards upgrading can be identified based on the 
speed at which the regional standard is upgraded to the international standard and will be 
the ones this paper focuses on.  The first is the one go approach: member countries   3
regionally harmonize and upgrade their standards for the selected product at once, 
equating the regional standard to the international standard.  This approach is followed by 
RTAs like the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN),   
 
The second approach is the gradual upgrading approach: member countries upgrade 
their standards gradually towards the international standard rather than immediately.   
This approach tends to be followed by RTAs with members that have a technological 
level or health, security and environment objectives that are not aligned with international 
standards.  Such is the case of the Andean Community and Mercosur.  In order to 
guarantee market access as standards rise, member countries coordinate their upgrading 
by regionally harmonizing their standards towards a certain intermediate level.  Exports 
satisfying this intermediate standards level are guaranteed market access to member 
countries’ markets. 
 
To date, RTAs in the developing world have not begun to realize their full potential for 
overcoming standards related obstacles to regional or global trade.  Though there is yet 
no clear best practice, it is possible to draw some common principles from RTAs’ past 
experiences and from existing literature for a more effective upgrading and harmonizing 
process of standards and conformity assessment procedures: prioritize sectors for reform; 
build trust between RTA members; set a quality regulation based on simplification, 
transparency and dynamism; allow for gradual reform if needed; build regulatory 
capacity; and promote mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the scarce literature on regional approaches to standards 
upgrading.  It complements Kotschwar’s (2001) review of standards in Latin American 
RTAs and Xiaoyang-Chen and Mattoo’s (2004) assessment of the impact of regional 
standards agreements on trade by employing information obtained through interviews to 
draw lessons from RTAs’ experiences on standards upgrading.  The interviews were 
conducted with representatives of firms, business associations, laboratories, accreditation 
bodies, standardization bodies, and national and regional bodies of TBT and SPS 
standards in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Washington DC. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly presents standards and conformity 
assessment procedures.  Section 2 reviews the unilateral and coordinated approaches to 
standards upgrading.  Section 3 examines RTA standards upgrading and harmonizing 
experiences and derives some common features.  Section 4 presents principles that can 
guide developing countries in the process of regional upgrading and harmonizing of 
standards and conformity assessment procedures and suggestions for a more effective 
participation in the international standards arena.  The last section concludes. 
 
 
1  STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
A standard outlines the special characteristics of processes, products, or services.   
Standards facilitate trade since they “stipulate what can or cannot be exchanged and 
define the procedures that must be followed for exchange to take place” (Brenton   4
2004:1).  Thus complying with standards requirements in foreign markets is a critical 
factor determining market access to those markets.
2   
 
Standards can be of a voluntary or compulsory nature.  A technical regulation is a 
compulsory standard imposed by a government at the local, regional or national level to 
secure health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection.  A technical regulation 
for instance can specify the limit of car exhaust emission levels.  A voluntary standard is 
a market driven standard that “reflects the demands and tastes of consumers or the 
technological requirements of industrial purchasers” (Brenton 2004:1).  A voluntary 
standard for instance specifies the type of knobs used in a car.  Note that while the 
satisfaction of a voluntary standard is legally voluntary, it is de facto necessary to secure 
sales since most voluntary standards are enforced by the market (Hufbauer, Kotschwar 
and Wilson 2001).  It would therefore be more accurate to name these two types of 
standards public and private standards, but we will follow convention and refer to them 
as technical regulations and voluntary standards. 
 
The conformity assessment process involves those procedures that ensure that a firm’s 
product (service) satisfies the specifications set in a standard.  It encompasses one or 
more of the following procedures (Wilson 1995): testing (a manufacturer’s declaration of 
conformity through testing conducted on its own laboratory or a third party laboratory), 
inspection (independent inspection of parts, materials and final products), certification 
(formal certification by a third party that a product conforms to particular standards, 
which often includes the granting of mark, certificate or label), registration (independent 
audit of manufacturing quality systems that results in registration with a quality systems 
registrar, i.e., ISO 9000 or ISO 14000), and accreditation (evaluating and attesting that 
testing and calibration laboratories, certification bodies  and  inspection bodies are 
technically competent to perform a specified task). 
 
There are two main differences between tariffs and standards and conformity assessment 
procedures.  The first difference is their objective. The objective of tariffs is to limit 
trade, whereas the ultimate objective of standards and conformity assessment is to 
facilitate trade by protecting health, safety and the environment, and by improving 
productive efficiency. When these legitimate objectives are satisfied, standards serve a 
public goal and their removal is undesirable since they correct a market failure.  Such 
market failure can arise from invisible health and safety attributes of products, negative 
environmental externalities, or incompatibility between products because of lack of 
coordination between producers.  Tariffs, however, are always trade barriers and create 
therefore a distortion.  Standards and conformity assessment are only trade barriers when 
differences in voluntary standards, technical regulations or conformity assessment 
procedures across countries are not justified by the legitimate objectives they aim to 
fulfill or when they are not publicized.  The second difference is that tariffs are a static 
measure, whereas standards and conformity assessment are dynamic measures.  They are 
dynamic because they need to evolve as technology and consumer requirements for 
product quality and safety change over time.   
                                                 
2 See Swan, Temple and Schumer (1996) and Jaffee and Henson (2004) for an analysis of the positive 
effect that standards can have on export performance.   5
 
Differences across countries in standards and conformity assessment increase transaction 
costs leading to less trade.  When domestic and foreign standards and conformity 
assessments do not coincide, double costs are imposed on the producers catering for 
domestic and export markets since they must produce the product under two different 
standards and the product has to be subject to testing at origin and destination.  These 
costs are further aggravated if different trading partners have different standards.  For 
example, representatives of the US industry claimed that meeting the EU’s tests for 
telecommunications equipment takes  
 
six to eight weeks, reducing product value by five to ten percent (USITC, 1998, 
4-2)[...] [D]uplication of mandatory U.S. and EU testing for computers, 
telecommunications equipment, and similar IT products raised costs for U.S. 
companies by more than $1.3 billion annually (USITC,1998, 4-8). Finally, some 
importing nations require compliance with specific norms that duplicate 
international standards, raising an additional and unnecessary testing cost 
(Maskus, Wilson, Otsuki 2001:23). 
 
 
The OECD (1996) found that in the case of small firms in developing countries differing 
standards and technical regulations between markets, combined with the cost of testing 
and compliance certification, could constitute between two and 10 percent of overall 
production costs – not an insignificant amount (Kotschwar 2001:142).  A 1993 study 
commissioned by the Australian Minister for Trade  
 
on the extent to which standards could represent a non-tariff barrier to trade in 
the APEC region concluded that a modest liberalisation of trade restricting 
standards could increase regional trade by possibly 20 per cent, which represents 
an increase of about 3 per cent to regional GDP (Andison 1996:1). 
 
 
The case of pallets illustrates the distortionary effects of differences in standards across 
countries (see Box 1).  
   6
Box 1: Proliferation of standards increases trade costs and can lead to proliferation of standards in 
other sectors: the case of pallets. 
 
The case of pallets illustrates the impact of non-harmonization of standards on trade.  It is a particularly 
interesting case because of the many different pallet standards and the prevalent use of pallets – 80 percent 
of freight containers leaving the US contain products that are stored in pallets. 
 
The pallet is a portable, horizontal, rigid platform used as a base for storing, staking, handling, and 
transporting goods as a unit load (National Wooden Pallet & Container Association 2004). The 
development of the pallet was one of the two key innovations for storage and distribution of the twentieth 
century (Le Blanc 2002).  It was developed in the 1930s in the US to protect the product, improve storage 
and make distribution more efficient.  Its use spread rapidly to the rest of the world.  However, as transport 
companies in other countries adopted the pallet, many employed pallets with different standards.  At 
present, there are thousands of different pallet standards active in the world: pallets vary in size, 
composition, and potential health and environment hazard. 
 
This multiplicity of standards diminishes the efficiency of distribution that the pallets were initially 
designed for.  If the destination country refuses entry of pallets that do not satisfy a particular standard or 
the local machinery cannot work with pallets that do not satisfy a particular standard, the goods have to be 
manually transferred to a pallet that satisfies that standard.  This increases the cost of handling, extends 
transport time, leads to greater losses due to damaged goods, and causes the additional cost of having to 
rent different pallets depending on the market of destination.  Even when the destination country accepts 
entry of pallets of different standards, the use of different pallet sizes leads to poor container space use and 
increases trade costs.  A European study conducted by AT Kearney concluded that “current pallet heights 
make poor use of vehicle inner heights... as a result, 15% additional grocery trucks are required” (Penman 
1997:6).  The space that would be saved loading standardized pallets into containers can represent 1.2 
percent of the retail sales price.  The multiplicity of standards increases trade costs for all countries and is 
particularly challenging for developing countries.  Developing countries’ lower access to pallet rental 
markets grants them less flexibility to satisfy trading partners’ pallet requirements. 
 
While there are legitimate environmental and phytosanitary reasons why some countries apply stricter 
standards, there appears to be no legitimate justification for having many different pallet sizes.  The ideal 
solution would be the harmonization of pallet sizes.  This has proven to be a daunting challenge because 
regions employ different pallet sizes and are reticent to abandon them.  To make matters worse, the non-
harmonization in the pallet sector appears to be leading to diversity in previously harmonized sectors.  
Though the European Commission is complaining about the diversity of standards, it is trying to create 
diversity of standards in the field where standardization is the most widespread worldwide: containers. 
Since the Europallet fits very badly in the standard ISO container, the EU is developing a new container, 
the EILU, with a larger size.  Such move will break away from the harmonized container standard and 
increase transport costs for the rest of the world. 
 




To reduce transaction costs associated with differences in standards a number of 
international standards bodies (like ISO and IEC) have elaborated international voluntary 
standards and are encouraging countries to harmonize their standards with these 
international standards.  The harmonization of standards in the electronic industry for 
instance has allowed for greater interoperability between products reducing production 
costs and allowing for greater fragmentation of production between countries.  The 
harmonization of terminology and product definitions in other sectors has also 
diminished transaction and information costs. 
   7
Developing countries are generally characterized by a weak standardization  culture.   
Products tend to be produced with little emphasis on the satisfaction of standards and 
consumers are typically less inclined to complain or return products that are unsafe or 
have defects.  Examples of this are the Peruvian import of Chinese sweets with 
incomplete translations of their labeling (which poses a risk for people with allergies) or 
the sale in some African countries of processed food after their expiry date (see Box 2).   
 
 
Box 2: Weak standardization culture in developing countries 
 
An illustrative example of the weak standardization culture in developing countries can be seen in the 
office of a director in the Ministry of Industry in a Latin American country.  As pointed out by the director, 
the office had three doors with different dimensions, eight window panels with different widths and a table 
with a different height and composition to that of other offices.  This purposeless asymmetry increases 




However, since the late nineties there has been an increasing interest among developing 
countries in product standards.  There have been efforts on the part of standardization 
bodies and governments to improve the standardization culture among firms and 
consumers through awareness campaigns and the promotion of standards setting. 
 
Standards upgrading can help developing countries assimilate foreign technology, 
increase demand and export quality and reduce transaction and production costs.  For 
example, Vietnam upgraded its motorbike standards to ISO standards and later graduated 
to higher standards increasing its competitiveness in this product.  Improvements in the 
meat sector in Uruguay allowed it to enter the US organic meat market and get a 30% 
higher price.
3  Meeting international standards secured market access to Peruvian 
asparagus producers in the EU (Jaffee and Henson 2004). 
 
LDCs are increasingly being left out from the benefits of greater integration between 
developed countries.  The recent regional standards agreements between developed 
countries have increased intra-regional trade and exports of excluded developed countries 
into these regions, but have reduced exports of developing countries into these regions 
(Xiaoyang-Chen and Mattoo 2004).  A possible reason for this, argue Xiaoyang-Chen 
and Mattoo, is that developing country firms are more hurt by the increase in the 
stringency of standards that results from these regional standards agreements and 
therefore benefit less from economies of scale in that integrated market.  Standards 
upgrading will enable developing countries to benefit from the greater integration 
between developed countries. 
 
The setting of higher standards can impede trade if they are motivated by protectionist 
sentiment and are applied in a discriminatory fashion against imports. This concern led 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to set up the framework for product health, safety, 
and environmental regulations through the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS).  The TBT and SPS frameworks 
                                                 
3 Note, however, that sale costs also increased due to the higher cost of getting an organic certification.   8
establish the guidelines to be followed so that the setting of standards is not performed 
with protectionist intentions.  These agreements regulate voluntary standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment activities.  They do not cover services and do not 
apply to government procurement activities.  They are obligatory for all WTO members, 
though are not yet strongly enforced.  
 
The SPS Agreement covers all measures whose purpose is to protect:  human or animal 
health from food-borne risks; human health from animal- or plant-carried diseases; or 
animals and plants from pests or diseases.  The TBT Agreement covers all technical 
regulations, voluntary standards and the procedures to ensure that these are met, except 
when these are sanitary or phytosanitary measures as defined by the SPS Agreement.
4  
 
The six main principles of the TBT and SPS rules are: 
 
1- Non-discrimination requirement. 
 
2- Proportionality requirement: regulations must not be more burdensome than necessary. 
 
3- Regional and national standards should be based, to the greatest extent possible, on 
international standards. 
 
4- Sanitary regulations must be based on available scientific evidence. 
 
5- Countries are encouraged to recognize each other’s standards and testing procedures as 
equivalent – i.e. if two countries have different ways to fulfill the same objective, they 
should accept each other’s ways of fulfilling it. 
 
6- Enhance the exchange of information among the member governments and increase 
transparency in the standards-setting process. 
 
With regard to transparency and information systems, countries are required under the 
WTO TBT arrangement to establish enquiry points or centers of information to answer 
queries and provide relevant documentation in a timely and cost-effective manner. Most 
of the RTAs in the Americas have established enquiry points and encourage member 
countries to make notifications concerning standards-related measures (Kotschwar 2001).  
 
The TBT and SPS disputes are becoming more prominent in WTO disputes.  During the 
first five years of operation of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 25 
cases (13 percent of the total) referenced standards-related provisions (Kotschwar 2001).   
 
 
2  DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE UPGRADING OF STANDARDS AND RECOGNITION 
OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 
 
This section will first examine different approaches to standards upgrading and will then 
examine different approaches to the recognition of conformity assessment procedures. 
 
                                                 
4 Taken from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm   9
2.1  UNILATERAL AND COORDINATED APPROACHES TO STANDARDS UPGRADING 
 
Drawing from countries’ experiences, two main approaches to upgrading standards can 
be identified: unilateral and coordinated (see Figure 1).  In the unilateral approach a 
country upgrades its standards for a product or products by unilaterally adopting the 
international standards.  The main positive aspects of adopting international standards 
are: first, it provides a positive signal to buyers that the country in general has a 
“standards culture.”  Second, since international standards are recognized by the TBT and 
SPS agreements, adopting these standards provides legitimacy to the country adopting 
them.  The country’s standards would automatically be presumed to be consistent with 
the WTO agreements.  Lastly, adhering to international standards may facilitate market 
access to other countries.   
 
 
Figure 1: Different approaches to standards upgrading and harmonizing 
 
Unilateral: unilateral adoption of international standards (e.g. Chile). 
 
Coordinated: countries coordinate their standards upgrading 
 
Cooperation approach: low levels of enforcement and of formal institutions.  Objective can be 
standards harmonization (e.g. APEC) or standards compatibility (e.g. Chile-USA). 
 
RTA approach: higher degree of enforcement and of formal institutions. Regional standards 
harmonization between RTA members. Different upgrading speeds: 
- Upgrading in one go to international standards (e.g. ASEAN) 




There are two potential shortcomings to this approach: the first is that the technological 
content and the health, security, and environment objectives of the international standard 
may not be aligned with the country’s development stage since the international standards 
are generally set by the OECD countries.  In countries where differences in objectives are 
marked and where the domestic market is small the readjustment costs of upgrading to 
international standards is high and the potential benefit for the domestic economy is low 
due to small economies of scale.  Such countries might consider setting different 
standards for the domestic market and the export sector. 
 
The second potential shortcoming is that WTO regulations on standards are not yet 
compulsory.  Thus, the returns – in terms of greater market access – to adopting the 
international standard only materialize if the country’s trading partners accept products 
produced at the international standard.  The satisfaction of an international standard is not 
a guarantee of market access into the OECD markets, to name just one example.  In these 
markets the requirement to satisfy additional voluntary standards is becoming more 
prevalent – e.g. some EU supermarkets require that imports satisfy the voluntary standard 
EUROGAP, which stipulates good farming practices that suppliers must adhere to. 
 
The second type of approach is the coordinated approach, which entails coordination 
between countries.  To guarantee positive returns in terms of market access to the costly   10
process of standards upgrading, a group of countries can cooperate with each other to 
ensure that products reaching a particular standard level (which is not necessarily the 
international standard level) will be accepted in each others’ markets.   
 
Two distinct coordinated approaches have been followed: the cooperation approach and 
the RTA approach.  The cooperation approach is that followed by bilateral trade 
agreements, like Chile-USA, and by multilateral cooperative agreements, like APEC.   
This approach involves less formal institutions and lower levels of enforcement and of 
trust between members than the RTA approach.  Since the cooperation approach 
(bilateral and multilateral) does not entail the elimination of tariffs between members, a 
member can resort to greater tariffs to prevent entry into a particular sector even though 
imports satisfy the agreed standards level.  In countries where tariffs are bounded at 
levels close to the applied levels, the risk of tariff increases is less and thus the likelihood 
of standards harmonization succeeding is greater.  This explains to some extent why the 
EU and ASEAN have agreed to start harmonizing standards in agriculture and three other 
sectors between the two regions as a first step towards negotiating a trade agreement 
(Financial Times 9/9/2004).  The two regions are able to start by harmonizing standards 
rather than tariffs because their tariffs are already bounded at low levels, which limits 
their ability to increase tariffs to prevent entry of products satisfying the harmonized 
standards. 
 
Another limitation of the cooperation approach is that the dispute panels have a 
mediation role not an arbitration role.  For these reasons, unless all parties are committed 
to the upgrading process, the process of standards upgrading could be faced with 
important obstacles. 
 
The ultimate objective of the cooperative approach can be standards harmonization, as in 
APEC, or standards compatibility, as in most bilateral trade agreements (see Table 1).  
The difference between standards harmonization and standards compatibility is that the 
latter implies members must change their standards only to the extent necessary for 
compatibility to be possible, whereas harmonization seeks making members’ standards 
the same.   11
 
Table 1. Objectives of Standards-Related Policies    
         Right to 
    Compatibility   establish level 
Agreements   Policy objective   and equivalence   of protection 
WTO Harmonize  No  No 
      
Customs unions      
Andean Community  Harmonize  No  No 
ASEAN Harmonize  No  No 
Central American Common Market  Harmonize  No  No 
CARICOM Harmonize  No  No 
EU Make  compatible/harmonize  Equivalence  No 
MERCOSUR Harmonize  No  No 
      
Free trade agreements      
APEC Make  compatible  Yes  Yes 
NAFTA Make  compatible  Yes  Yes 
Group of Three (Mexico, Colombia & Venezuela) Make  compatible  Yes  Yes 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Make  compatible  Yes  Yes 
Bolivia-Mexico Make  compatible  Yes  No 
Chile-Mexico Make  compatible  Compatibility  Yes 
Costa Rica-Mexico  Make compatible  Yes  Yes 
México-Nicaragua Make  compatible  Yes  Yes 
Mexico-Northern Triangle  Make compatible  Yes  Yes 
Central America-Chile  Make compatible  Yes  No 
Central America-Dominican Republic  Make compatible  Yes  No 
CARICOM-Dominican Republic  Make compatible  Yes  No 
Note: The Canada-Chile agreement does not address technical barriers to trade.    
Source: Based on Kotschwar (2001).      
 
 
The second type of coordinated approach is the RTA approach, which is the approach 
followed by RTAs to upgrade standards.  It seeks to harmonize member countries’ 
standards regionally either by upgrading standards in one go and equating them to the 
international standards or by setting regional standards and gradually upgrading them 
towards the international standard.  This approach is characterized by more formal 
institutions, a higher degree of enforcement and greater trust.  Such trust originates from 
the more frequent interactions between members and the more comprehensive nature of 
the agreement, which allows for the possibility of cross-issue retaliation.  Due to the 
elimination of intra-regional tariffs, RTA members cannot use tariffs to prevent the entry 
of a product satisfying the regional standard, hence increasing the certainty that a 
country’s upgrading efforts will be translated into greater market access.   
 
The RTA approach is increasingly being used by developing countries as a path to 
upgrading standards – e.g. Andean Community, Mercosur, and ASEAN.  It is for this 
reason that the rest of the paper focuses on this approach. 
 
 
2.2  DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE RECOGNITION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
PROCEDURES 
The success of a regional standards harmonization process in terms of greater regional 
trade and market access crucially depends on a country’s conformity assessment 
procedures being recognized by the other member countries: recognition of test data, 
product certification and competence of accredited conformity assessment bodies.   12
Otherwise, companies are obliged to perform additional or repeated tests of their products 
overseas or to invite foreign inspectors, increasing costs.  
 
There are different approaches to integrating members’ conformity assessment 
procedures.  The WTO TBT Agreement aims to prevent conformity assessment 
procedures from becoming trade barriers and favors their harmonization as a channel to 
promote greater integration.  This contrasts with the EU position, which does not 
consider harmonization as its axis for greater integration.   
 
The EU’s approach to integrating members’ conformity assessment procedures does not 
require full legislative uniformity or full centralization of supervision. It is based on the 
mutual recognition agreement (MRA).  This consists of mutual recognition of national 
laws (e.g. technical regulations), harmonization of national legislation only when mutual 
recognition is unworkable,
5 prevention of new barriers by establishing compulsory 
information mechanisms, and mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures.  
The latter is achieved by developing transparent criteria to determine when conformity 
assessment procedures should be considered comparable.  The MRAs are envisaged in 
the field of conformity assessment procedures for industrial products, based on the “once 
tested accepted everywhere principle”.  Country A trusts country B to certify that the 
products made by B satisfy the standards requirements of A.  The reliance on mutual 
recognition of both standards and conformity assessment even when harmonization is 
incomplete is what has allowed the successful establishment of the Single Market in 
highly regulated service industries like banking and insurance.
6  According to 2001 
estimates, 21% of industrial production inside the EU is covered by mutual recognition 
and about 28% of intra-EU manufacturing trade (Commission of European Communities 
2001).  It is estimated that ensuring the perfect operation of mutual recognition inside the 
EU would produce a maximum possible one-off increase in EU’s GDP of 1.8% 
(Commission of European Communities 2001).   
 
The EU has extended the concept of mutual recognition beyond the EU market and has 
been signing MRAs with some of its trading partners (among others, United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, and Japan).  The 1997 MRA 
between EU and USA was estimated to remove barriers on $40 billion worth of trade 
between both parties, and to eliminate up to 80% of compliance and testing costs.
7  The 
EU-US MRA was estimated to reduce direct costs to IT firms by $1.3 billion and to 
shrink approval periods and raise competition among testing laboratories (USITC, 1998, 
5-3 quoted in Maskus, Wilson, Otsuki 2001:26).   
 
                                                 
5 For example, homogenous certification structures have been created throughout Europe to generate 
confidence in testing and certification conducted abroad. 
6 A product satisfying a standard in the originating member country which is different to the standard of the 
destination member country will be allowed entry into the latter member’s market as long as it satisfies the 
minimum equivalence conditions.  Similarly, the destination member country will recognize the 
certification of the originating member country even if their conformity assessments are not equal so long 
as the conformity assessments of the two countries are comparable. 
7 An estimate performed before its implementation in 1997 reported in García Jiménez and Gardeñes 
Santiago (1997).  A similar value is reported by Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki (2001).   13
As noted by Xiaoyang Chen and Mattoo (2004), a key element of the MRA is the rule of 
origin, which determines where the product was made and therefore, the treatment the 
product receives.  Not all MRAs have the same rule of origin restrictions: 
 
The MRAs between the EU and USA and the EU and Canada specify that 
conformity assessment done in one of the MRA countries, in which products are 
manufactured or through which they are imported, is accepted throughout the 
entire agreement region.  Other agreements, such as the MRAs the EU has 
concluded with Australia and New Zealand, impose restrictive rules of origin 
which require that third country products continue to meet the conformity 
assessment of each country in the region (Xiaoyang Chen and Mattoo 2004:4).    
 
The impact of MRAs on third country’s exports to the region depends on whether they 
include rules of origin.  This can have important implications for developing countries.  
According to Xiaoyang Chen and Mattoo’s (2004) analysis, MRAs with rules of origin 
hurt the exports of extra-regional developing countries (39 percent decline) more than 
they hurt extra-regional developed country exports (28 percent decline).  In contrast, 
MRAs without rules of origin increase developing country exports to the region more 
than they increase developed country exports. 
 
There has been little progress in the area of mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures in the developing world.  The APEC countries have initiated a major action 
plan to conclude wide MRAs among its members (by 2010 for industrialized members 
and 2020 for developing-country members) in regulated sectors (electrical and electronic 
equipment, medical devices, chemicals, etc.).  The APEC countries signed an MRA in 
1998 for telecommunications equipment that was predicted to increase intra-APEC trade 
in IT goods, which amounted to $45 million that year (Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki 
2001:26). 
 
APEC, however, does not yet have a dispute resolution mechanism for differences in 
standards and conformity assessment.  Nearly all the sub-regional free trade agreements 
in the Americas include provisions encouraging their members to consider mutual 
recognition agreements (exceptions being Canada-Chile and CARICOM-Dominican 
Republic agreements) (see Table 2). The Andean Community is developing an incipient 
MRA agreement between its members and Mercosur is considering doing it in the near 
future.     14
 
Table 2. Scope and coverage of Standards-Related Measures            
                              Separate provision on 
     Measures  included   




Customs Unions                     
EU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MERCOSUR  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes No Yes  No  Yes Yes  No  No 
Andean Community  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
CACM
a Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
CARICOM Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
                      
Free trade agreements                     
NAFTA Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Group of Three  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Bolivia-Mexico Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Chile-Mexico
a Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Costa Rica-Mexico  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Mexico-Nicaragua Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mexico-Northern Triangle  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Canada-Chile No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Central America-Chile  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Central America-Dominican Rep.  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CARICOM-Dominican Rep.  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Notes: S=Standards; SPS=Sanitary, phytosanitary measures; TR=Technical Regulations; CAP=Conformity Assessment Procedures; A=Accreditation; 
C=Certification; T=Testing; M=Metrology; AP= Approval Procedures; MRAs=mutual recognition agreements. 
            a. Measures include authorization procedures.                   
Source: Based on Kotschwar (2001).                
 
 
3  RTA APPROACHES TO UPGRADING AND HARMONISING STANDARDS AND 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT. 
 
This section examines the potential positive and negative aspects of the RTA approach, 
the different types of RTA approaches, the general features of an RTA approach and its 
main challenges. 
 
3.1  POTENTIAL POSITIVE EFFECTS OF RTA UPGRADING AND HARMONIZATION 
 
A regional approach to upgrading and harmonizing standards and conformity assessment 
within the context of an RTA can provide stepping stones to greater participation in the 
global market.  An RTA approach could help overcome the following gaps: 
 
•  Economies of scale: The upgrade and harmonization of standards and of 
conformity assessment at the regional level reduces trade barriers allowing member 
countries to fragment their production, become more competitive, and reach higher 
economies of scale in production.  Xiaoyang-Chen and Mattoo (2004) analyze the 
impact of regional standards harmonization in developed RTAs (EC, EFTA, 
NAFTA, and CER
8) and find that it can have a significant positive impact on trade 
within the region and with third countries.  They find that implementing a 
                                                 
8 CER is the Closer Economic Relations agreement between Australia and New Zealand.   15
harmonizing directive in a manufacturing industry between two countries raises 
their imports from each other by 32 percent and imports from a third country 
outside the harmonizing region by ten percent.  The first magnitude is explained by 
the reaping of greater economies of scale within the region and the second 
magnitude is explained by the reduction in the cost exporters in the third country 
need to incur to satisfy the standards of the members in the region. 
 
RTAs can also help member countries realize economies of scale in the regulation 
of standards through the creation of regional bodies for regulation, accreditation, 
certification, metrology, inquiry points, and international representation.  These 
regional bodies pool member countries’ staff, finance, equipment, and infrastructure 
providing therefore a more cost-efficient service.  
 
•  Learning by doing: the interaction with other member countries during a process 
of deep regional integration can help a country better learn the complexities of the 
regulatory process and develop its regulatory capacity. 
 
•  Information failure: RTAs can help overcome informational gaps at three 
different levels: 
 
o  Improve the management of information so that local firms are better 
informed about foreign standards. A regional body can gather information 
on foreign standards and share it with all firms in the region, rather than each 
member having to spend resources obtaining the same information.  Greater 
knowledge about the standard requirements in different foreign markets would 
enhance transparency and predictability and would lead to a more effective 
and less costly management of information concerning standards at home and 
abroad. 
 
o  Participate more effectively in the shaping of international standards. 
Pooled financial and human resources would enable member countries to 
participate more effectively in the SPS and TBT committees and in 
international voluntary standards committees like ISO and IEC. Regional 
bodies can help develop common positions for international discussions of 
international standards. 
 
o  Provide a positive signaling effect (improve an image problem).  If countries 
join up in an RTA with a member country that has internationally accredited 
laboratories or certification bodies (Product, Management System, Personnel), 
having their laboratories and certification bodies accredited by that country is 
likely to yield international accreditation. 
 
•  Division of labor: The mutual recognition of member countries’ accreditation and 
certification services would grant firms access to the services of the certification 
and accreditation bodies of other member countries.  This could eventually lead to 
the specialization of certification and accreditation bodies in the region in different 
products according to their expertise, allowing a more efficient use of resources and 
greater international recognition.   16
 
•  Trust: A process of regional integration leads to an environment where the 
different actors are more willing to negotiate the reform of standards and 
conformity assessment procedures.  This is explained by the greater trust between 
members resulting from closer interactions, greater transparency, peer pressure and 
possible cross-issue retaliation. 
 
•  Greater effectiveness: Regional approaches to prevent or eradicate animal and 




3.2  POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF RTA UPGRADING AND HARMONIZATION 
 
An RTA upgrading and harmonizing could also have negative effects for some or even 
all of its members.  Xiaoyang-Chen and Mattoo (2004) find that in those member 
countries with less stricter initial standards than the harmonized standard the benefits 
from harmonization in terms of intra-regional economies of scale can be offset by an 
increased production cost due to a stricter standard.  However, this increase in production 
costs can be accompanied by greater extra-regional market access, since the member 
country is more likely to satisfy extra-regional standards requirements now that its 
products satisfy a stricter standard.  The sign of the overall effect depends on the 
strictness of the initial standards, the strictness of the harmonized standard relative to that 
of extra-regional partners and the size of the country’s intra-regional market relative to its 
extra-regional market.   
 
If a country’s exports to the region are small relative to its exports to the rest of the 
world, the adjustment costs of harmonizing at the regional level may outweigh the gains 
in intra-regional trade.  The situation is worsened if the regional standards drive the 
country’s standards away from those of its extra-regional partners, as it will cause a loss 
in extra-regional market access.  In such a case, the country might be better off upgrading 
its standards unilaterally.  
 
The returns to RTA harmonization can be reduced if regional bodies do not make good 
use of resources or there is low progress in standards and conformity assessment 
harmonization or if standards are set with protectionist intentions.   
 
Lastly, a process of regional harmonization that sets stricter standards could divert trade 
away from low-cost extra-regional partners towards higher cost regional producers 
(Xiaoyang-Chen and Mattoo 2004). 
 
 
3.3  TYPES OF RTA APPROACHES TO STANDARDS UPGRADING AND HARMONIZATION 
 
This section focuses on two particular RTA approaches to standards upgrading and 
harmonization in the developing world, it draws some lessons from the EU experience 
and then examines the state of harmonization of conformity assessment procedures in 
these RTAs.    17
 
3.3.1  THE ONE GO APPROACH AND THE GRADUAL APPROACH 
 
Two main types of RTA approaches to standards upgrading and harmonization can be 
identified based on the speed at which standards are upgraded to the international 
standard: the one go approach and the gradual approach.   
 
In the one go approach member countries upgrade their standards for the selected product 
in one go, setting it equal to the international standard.  This approach was adopted for 
instance by the ASEAN countries.  These countries have set a regional ASEAN standard 
equal to the international standard for 20 selected products – mostly from the electronics 
sector, a sector with low government regulation.  Even if a member country does not 
adopt the ASEAN standard, it is obliged to accept the entry of products from a member 
country if they satisfy the ASEAN standards.
9  If a country violates an ASEAN 
regulation, it can end up losing concessions or paying compensation.  Such enforcement 
guarantees a positive return – in terms of market access – to a country’s upgrading of its 
standards to the international level and thus promotes members’ harmonization of 
standards at the international level.  Another positive aspect of these agreements is that 
there is no need for standards committees to develop regional standards, since they are 
simply equated to the international standard.   
 
The gradual approach is that followed by RTAs that do not wish to equate their standards 
to international standards for a particular product or for all products because their 
members’ technological level or health, security and environment objectives are not 
aligned with international standards.  This is the case for instance of the Andean 
Community and Mercosur.  The criteria followed by the Andean Community and 
Mercosur to set regional technical regulations is the following.  The regional technical 
regulation is based on the international standards, unless these are not compatible with 
the health, safety or environmental objectives of the region or its technological structure.  
That being the case, the regional technical regulation will be based on subregional, 
regional or national voluntary standards, in that order of preference.  The regional 
voluntary standards in both RTAs are set trying to bring members’ voluntary standards 
closer to international standards.
10 
 
The regional voluntary standards are set by members’ standardization bodies (which are 
established by the private sector) and the regional technical regulations are set by 
members’ technical regulation bodies (which are government bodies).  By 2004, 
Mercosur had developed around 370 regional voluntary standards and 407 regional 
technical regulations (TBT and SPS).  The Andean Community had harmonized technical 
regulations for 31 agricultural products, which represents around 60 percent of intra-
regional trade.   
 
                                                 
9 The harmonization requirement is not applicable if a member country notifies that it is unable to adopt the 
international standard due to climatic conditions or infrastructure-related reasons. 
10 Section 4 explains in more detail how these regional standards are set.   18
The one go and the gradual approaches are distinct from the approaches followed by 
other RTAs like NAFTA, FTAA, and the Group of Three (see Table 1), where members 
aim to make their standards compatible with each other rather than harmonize them.  
 
 
3.3.2  THE EU EXPERIENCE, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT? 
 
The EU has the most comprehensive approach to harmonization of standards and 
conformity assessment.  Its approach is markedly different from that of any other RTA 
and has undergone different phases.   
 
Though by 1968 the EU customs union was complete, progress on the single market was 
blocked during a decade and a half by all manner of non-tariff barriers:   
 
Up to 70 forms were needed by truck drivers crossing EC borders; public 
contracts were reserved for national companies; product standards and 
professional qualifications were neither harmonised nor given mutual 
recognition; service industries were largely confined to their own member state; 
capital movements were not liberalized (Leach 2000).
11 
 
The EU had been attempting before 1985 to set regional standards on the basis of 
members’ unanimous decisions and specifying in great detail products’ specifications.  
The EU realized that these features slowed down the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
and developed in 1985 the New Approach.
12  This new approach is based on the principle 
of mutual recognition of standards or principle of equivalence: a country must accept the 
standards of member countries if such standards have the same objectives (they are then 
considered as equivalent).  The burden of proof is not on the exporting firm but on the 
importer, who must prove scientifically that the objectives of the standards of the 
imported product differ from the objectives of the domestic product’s standard.  Only in 
those sectors where the principle of equivalence cannot be applied because of the great 
divergence between standards (like health and safety requirements), does the EU follow a 
process of harmonization of standards.  Since 1986, decisions are not based on unanimity 
but on qualified majority voting.   
 
Support for the new approach was strengthened by studies like that of Cecchini, Catinat 
and Jacquemin (1988) also known as the “Cost of Non-Europe Report” which estimated 
the costs of barriers like divergent standards and technical regulations, border controls 
and customs red tape, conflicting business law and protectionist procurement practice to 
cost $243,000 billion. 
 
The criteria used in setting EU technical regulations is based on the minimum 
requirement approach, which does not seek necessarily harmonization with international 
standards – unlike the Andean Community, Mercosur and ASEAN which do.  Under this 
approach EU technical regulations are only concerned with guaranteeing health and 
security and protecting the environment and thus set only those specifications necessary 
                                                 
11 Quote taken from Single market definition at http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/s.html 
12 See European Commission (2000) for a detailed description of this approach.   19
to guarantee these objectives.  The rest of the product and process specifications are left 
to the private sector to determine through the setting of voluntary standards.  These 
voluntary standards however must comply with the technical regulations.  Technical 
regulations and voluntary standards are therefore complementary in the EU framework: 
the satisfaction of the voluntary standard implies the satisfaction of the technical 
regulation.  This framework yields a very flexible system of voluntary standards and 
technical regulations that is quick in keeping up with technological changes.  Technical 
regulations will not be as sensitive to technological changes as voluntary standards since 
they are only concerned with health, security and environment aspects, and not with the 
technical characteristics of the production process and the product, which are more prone 
to technological change. For example, technological advances in electronics affect the 
requirements of cars’ motherboards – which would be regulated by voluntary standards – 
but they are not as likely to affect a car’s road safety features (which would be regulated 
by technical regulations).  This leads to quicker adaptation to change since voluntary 
standards being set by the private sector are developed faster than technical regulations, 
which are set by public entities.   
 
The EU harmonization process is also markedly different from that of Mercosur and the 
Andean Community in that the objective of the harmonization of SPS standards is the 
elimination of intra-community borders: 
 
the advanced level of veterinary and phytosanitary harmonization has led to the 
abolition of intra-community borders since 1993 and free circulation of 
agricultural products (EU 1998:4.6). 
 
In contrast, Mercosur and the Andean Community allow countries to keep their sanitary 
and phytosanitary independence.  The harmonization of SPS standards does not have as 
an objective the elimination of intra-community borders since it respects the particular 
sanitary requirements of each member.  Furthermore, compliance with a veterinary and 
phytosanitary standard in Mercosur does not prevent the application of the national 
importing process, including physical inspection.  
 
The justification given in Report 4.6.2 by Mercosur for not fully harmonizing SPS 
standards is that  
 
as a result of the elimination of frontier controls inside the EC, the overall 
requirements for imports imposed by the EC tend to be higher than necessary as 
they may relate to the more extreme sub-regional situations (e.g. the Newcastle 
disease) (EU 1998:4.6). 
 
However, no economic study has been performed to assess if the costs of having stricter 
SPS standards than are really necessary are greater than the benefits resulting from the 
reduction in trade barriers.  The result of such analysis is likely to depend, among other 
factors, on the heterogeneity of sanitary conditions across member countries. 
 
There are other significant differences between the EU and the Andean Community and 
Mercosur, which are presented in Table 3 and discussed in section 3.4.   20
 
The EU approach is not without defects. The single market remains an uncompleted 
process:  
 
financial services and public procurement are still far from being liberalized, 
compliance levels vary considerably between member states and anti-competitive 
practices abound” (Leach 2000)
13. 
 
Leach (2000) argues that a vigorous program of mutual recognition of standards might 
have been at least as successful in promoting economic activity as the harmonization 
policies followed.
14  Pelkmans, Vos and Di Mauro (2000) worry about the numerous 
Euopean standards created in some sectors and wonder if they have been subjected to a 
cost-benefit test to assess if they are contributing to economic optimality.  They also 
point out that, in spite of the considerable efforts since the mid-1980s towards 
liberalizing, approximating standards, and applying mutual recognition; mutual 
recognition is still facing considerable practical problems and there is a worrying trend 
toward ever increasing national product regulation.  This concern is shared by Pelkmans 
(2002) who criticizes the modest contribution of the principle of mutual recognition to 
the realization of free movement in the single market.  He argues that business in the EU 
have been somewhat disenchanted by the many costs and uncertainty in its application in 
practice.
15  Businesses find it difficult and uncertain to verify the “equivalence” of 
objectives of health and safety between members.
16  This is further aggravated by the 
absence of sectoral rule books and the next-to-prohibitive costs of monitoring the 
application of the principle.  Pelkmans concludes that the solution consists of greater 
mutual recognition:  
 
the manifold benefits of mutual recognition for Europe are too great to allow the 
present ambiguities to continue. The Union needs much more pro-active 
approaches to reduce the costs of mutual recognition as well as permanent 
monitoring structures for its application to services (analogous to those already 
successfully functioning in goods markets). Above all, what is required is a 
"mutual recognition culture" so that the EU can better enjoy the fruits of its own 
regulatory ingenuity (2002:2). 
 
 
This mutual recognition culture among national authorities would stimulate permanent 
exposure to healthy competition throughout the EU market, without sacrificing justified 
health, safety and consumer protection concerns (Pelkmans 2002).  This does not imply 
forgetting about harmonization. As Pelkmans notes, total liberalization, harmonization 
and mutual recognition all have limitations and no single method can suffice for all cases.   
                                                 
13 Quote taken from Single market definition at http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/s.html 
14 http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/s.html 
15 Pelkmans notes that “[d]uring the mid-nineties the disenchantment with MR [Mutual Recognition] was 
so strong that that UNICE (the European confederation of industry) recommended a return to 
harmonization as a superior option” (2002:3) 
16 An analysis of the difficulties of determining and proving equivalence under the principle of mutual 
recognition can be found in Gardeñes-Santiago (1999).   21
 
Table 3. Comparison of EU, Mercosur, and Andean Community strategies of harmonization of standards and conformity assessment 
   EU MERCOSUR  Andean  Community 
Type of agreement  Common market.  Customs Union.  Customs Union. 
Institutional 









CEN (general standards), CELENEC 
(electrotechnical standards) & ETSI 
(telecommunications standards). 
MCS (Mercosur Committee of 
Standardization).  Secretariat. 
Criteria in setting 
regional standards 
Regional standard tends towards the 
high range of members' initial 
standards. 
International standards, then sub-regional 
standards and then national standards. 




Harmonization of tech. reg. led by 
countries' demand and voluntary 
standards by private sector. 
Harmonization of tech. reg. led by 
countries' demand and voluntary 
standards by private sector. 
Targeted harmonization. Led by 
private sector and governments but 
at times also by Secretariat with 
strategic purposes. 
Harmonization of 
national tech. reg.? 
No, only required to satisfy minimum 
requirements. Harmonization only in 
special cases. 
Yes. Yes. 
Voting structure to 
set regional tech. 
reg. 
Votes decided based on relative 
majority. Votes weighted to account 
for countries' economic size. 
Votes decided by unanimity. One member, 
one vote. Unanimity slows down 
decisions. Reform constrained by 
heterogeneity in size. 
Votes decided by unanimity. One 
member, one vote. Unanimity slows 
down decisions. 
Relationship 
between tech. reg. 
and vol. standards 
Complementary: tech. reg. sets 
minimum requirements and vol. 
standard specifies details. 
Competitive: tech. reg. are more 
ambitious. No clear delimitation between 
coverage of tech. reg. and vol. standard. 
Competitive: tech. reg. are more 
ambitious. No clear delimitation 
between coverage of tech. reg. and 
vol. standard. 
Involvement of 
private sector and 
consumers 
High. 
Low (weak consumer groups, foreign firms 
have large weight in private sector 
participation in standards). 
Low (weak consumer groups, foreign 
firms have large weight in private 
sector participation in standards). 
Perceptions of 
standards by 
private sector and 
consumers 
Consumers perceive tech. reg. as 
protecting their health. Private sector 
perceives vol. standards as 
necessary investment for 
competitiveness. 
Consumers and private sector do not 
realize importance of standards. 
Consumers and private sector do not 
realize importance of standards. 
Implementation  Compulsory once regulation 
approved. 
Only compulsory if all countries adopt 
resolution. No supranational power to 
force countries to adopt resolution. 
Compulsory once regulation 
approved. 
Dispute settlement 




bodies when they 
assist in setting 
regional standards 
Yes. EU gives money to national 
standardization bodies. 
No. CMG and MCS ask national bodies to 
develop standards to help in the 
harmonization of non-regulated sectors 
but do not pay them due to lack of 
resources. 
Harmonization of standards is 




Standard bodies establish common 
positions in international 
organizations (ISO, ISE, CODEX, 
WTO TBT & SPS). 
No common position yet, except in 
punctual cases. 
Secretariat is working to establish 
common positions in international 
organizations. 
Regional 
information point  Yes.  Not yet developed. Greater efforts in 




They have been aligned across 
countries and a principle of 
equivalence and mutual recognition 
is in effect. 
There is a move to harmonize them. 
Mutual recognition will be pursued in the 
near future. 
Incipient mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment procedures. 
Conformity 
assessment test 
At origin. Sporadic random post-
market tests in the market of 
destination. 
Double testing (at origin and at destination 
causing delays). 
At origin. Sporadic post-market 
random tests in the market of 
destination.   22
3.4  GENERAL FEATURES OF AN RTA STANDARD AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
UPGRADING AND HARMONIZATION PROCESS.    
 
This section presents the general features of a regional upgrading and harmonization 
process of standards and conformity assessment procedures.  These features are derived 
from the recent experience of the most advanced RTAs in terms of the speed of their 
standard upgrading and harmonizing - EU, Mercosur, Andean Community, and ASEAN. 
 
The harmonization of standards translates into greater market access and allows for 
greater interoperability (see Box 3).       
 
 
Box 3: Harmonization of standards leads to greater trade: examples in Mercosur and the Andean 
Community. 
 
Mercosur:  Dairy intra-regional exports grew at an annual growth rate of 13.9% from 1990 to 2000 
(COMTRADE data).  This growth is partially explained by the reductions resulting from the harmonization 
of technical regulations.  The harmonization of voluntary standards in the automotive industry increased the 
interoperability of automotive parts and increased intra-regional trade in cars and trucks.  With regard to 
SPS standards, the harmonization of cosmetic standards and of food colorants led to lower barriers and 
greater intra-regional trade in these products.  
 
Andean Community: The decision 491 harmonized technical regulations for the weight of trucks.  This 
was translated into a fall in the number of products blocked at customs.  The harmonization of a voluntary 
standard on white sugar increased trade in white sugar, as it eliminated the blocking of imports on the basis 
of different sugar definitions.  
 
Mercosur and the Andean Community have also harmonized their member countries’ system of control and 
reporting of diseases and have harmonized their vaccination programs, limiting the impact of health shocks 




The selected approach to harmonization is strongly influenced by the regulatory 
culture of the member countries and the strength of their institutions.  Countries in 
Mercosur and in the Andean Community have governments with a strong regulatory 
culture and paternalistic attitude.  In Mercosur and the Andean Community national 
(regional) technical regulations compete with national (regional) voluntary standards by 
setting detailed product and process specifications, unlike in the EU.  As a result, changes 
in technology make it necessary to change both technical regulations and voluntary 
standards, which leads to a less dynamic standard system than in the EU – where in most 
cases it is only voluntary standards that need to be changed. 
 
RTAs follow different criteria of standard harmonization. The new EU approach 
considers members’ technical regulations as equivalent so long as a minimum set of 
criteria are satisfied.  Only where the principle of equivalence is not possible due to the 
complexity of the product’s regulation, the EU applies standards harmonization.   
Mercosur and the Andean Community apply a more ambitious harmonization process.  
They develop regional technical regulations and regional voluntary standards with the 
expectation that members will replace them for their old technical regulations and 
voluntary standards, respectively.  As has already been mentioned, ASEAN countries set 
their regional standard equal to the international standard.   23
 
RTAs generate climate of trust and closer relations between institutions.  The close 
relationship between the different institutions within an RTA allows obstacles to be 
solved at times in informal ways before they are solved more formally. For instance, in 
the case of Mercosur, there is no mutual recognition of conformity assessment yet in 
paper, but many conflicts are de facto solved with a quick phone call to the respective 
person in the other member country.  Furthermore, participants at standards negotiations 




The speed at which standards agreements are implemented depends on the power 
granted to the regional institution. The EU, the Andean Community, and ASEAN have 
supranational power and their member countries are obliged to incorporate the technical 
regulations into their national regulations.
18  However, this is not the case in Mercosur.  A 
Mercosur regional technical regulation is valid only when all member countries adopt it 
and incorporate it into their legislations.  Since the institutional structure of Mercosur is 
intergovernmental and not supranational, there is no organism with enough authority to 
force a country to adopt a regional technical regulation.  Around half the Mercosur 
technical regulations are not yet adopted.  Lack of supranational power is translated into a 
lower degree of enforcement and lower speed of harmonization.  In RTAs based on 
intergovernmentality, like Mercosur, the speed with which a member country adopts a 
technical regulation is influenced by the power vested to its national committee for 
technical regulations. In some Mercosur countries the SGT3 and SGT11 representatives 
have a level much below that of the minister and consequently the communication with 
the minister, who is the person who decides if the regional technical regulation will be 
incorporated in the country, is not as fluid as in other countries. There have been cases 
were the SGT representatives have agreed to a technical regulation for it to be later 
dropped by the minister.  In the case of voluntary standards, none of the above RTAs 
imposes member countries to incorporate the regional voluntary standard, since its 
adoption is voluntary. 
 
The voting structure affects the speed of integration.  The EU in its initial stages of 
standard harmonization used the one-country one-vote unanimity system still used by 
Mercosur and the Andean Community for technical regulations.  As previously reported, 
to increase the pace of harmonization the EU changed to a voting system where country’s 
votes are weighted and decisions are made based on a qualified majority.  Though there 
exists awareness in Mercosur that the one country one vote unanimity system leads to a 
slower progress, the disproportionate size of Brazil hampers changing the voting structure 
to one of absolute majority.  In the case of regional voluntary standards, Mercosur takes 
the decision by consensus and the Andean Community by majority (3 out of 5), though 
the latter is considering switching to consensus in the near future. 
 
                                                 
17 Based on interviews. 
18 In the case of ASEAN, a member country is obliged to accept imports that satisfy these standards even if 
it chooses not to incorporate the standards.   24
There is no unique path to the harmonization of standards and the mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures.  The Andean Community, aware 
that its infrastructure condition and private sector awareness were worse than the EU’s 
initial conditions, decided towards the end of the 1990s to change its approach.  Its new 
approach to regional harmonization of standards and to mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment procedures is based on the following principles:
19 
 
- The creation of standards need not always be demand driven.  Due to the low 
involvement of its domestic private sector in the creation of standards, the Andean 
Community is now following a supply driven approach.  It is concentrating its 
standardization efforts in those sectors with large intra-industry trade rather than 
waiting for the private sector to demand such standardization.
20  The hope is that the 
creation of standards in these sectors will awaken the private sector’s demand for the 
setting of standards in other sectors. 
 
- Mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures need not take place 
after harmonization of standards. The Andean Community is following a different 
approach to that of other RTAs.  Rather than placing all its efforts in harmonizing 
standards in a context where there is little involvement of the private sector, they are 
simultaneously harmonizing conformity assessment procedures and establishing 
mutual recognition of conformity assessments.
21  This is possible thanks to the 
supranational authority of the Secretariat of the Andean Community.
22  I t  h a s  
imposed mutual recognition for conformity certificates emitted by accredited 
institutions in those sectors where intra-regional trade is greater, though it does not 
cover SPS standards.  The decision has already taken (Decisión 506), but its 
application is yet low.  It is hoped that the creation of mutual recognition agreements 
will increase the private sector’s demand for conformity assessment services and 
allow greater economies of scale in certification services (since borders are 
eliminated).  This will motivate laboratories to upgrade, reducing differences across 
members and facilitating harmonization.  These measures are complemented with 
technical assistance for accreditation bodies, which is being provided with EU 
collaboration. The objective is to ensure that the accrediting institutions are 
technically competent to accredit certification bodies, thereby facilitating mutual 
recognition at the Andean Community level and internationally. 
 
- Strategic harmonization of conformity assessment procedures.  Once members’ 
conformity assessment procedures in those sectors with greater intra-regional trade 
are brought closer, the Andean Community plans to harmonize the conformity 
                                                 
19 Based on interview. 
20 See Resolución 313 Actualización del Reglamento de la Red Andina de Normalización, 8
th of November 
1999, General Secretariat of the Andean Community. 
21 See Decisión 506 Reconocimiento y aceptación de certificados de productos que se comercialicen en la 
Comunidad Andina, 22
nd of June 2001, Commission of the Andean Community. 
22 In those countries where there is no accredited laboratory, the Andean Community provides a provisional 
accreditation “Organismo de certificación reconocido” to a laboratory and the certificates that it provides to 
products have to be recognized by other members (see Decision 506 of 2001 of the Andean Community).   25
assessment procedures of other products in the same production chains to ensure 
better interoperability.  
 
- The Andean Community Secretariat has set best practice guidelines in technical 
regulations.  Such guidelines guarantee that the creation of new technical regulations 
in member countries will be easier to harmonize regionally.
23  The creation also of a 
regional notification system that uses the same format as WTO lowers members’ cost 
of notification to the regional body and the WTO.
24 
 
The main focus of standard harmonization in Mercosur and the Andean 
Community is to reduce barriers to intra-regional trade.  However, they also focus on 
extra-regional trade to the extent that they set as their first criteria for regional standards 
getting closer to international standards (see Table 2). 
 
The type of products considered for harmonization of voluntary standards tends to 
differ from those considered for harmonization of technical regulations.  The private 
sector, which is mainly responsible for setting regional voluntary standards, tends to 
harmonize first those sectors that are not heavily regulated by technical regulations, 
which are set by governments.  The reason for this is that harmonization of voluntary 
standards in sectors heavily regulated by unharmonized technical regulations would be 
more difficult.  For instance, Mercosur’s initial efforts setting regional voluntary 
standards dealt mainly with the steel, iron and non-metal sector, whereas the regional 
technical regulations dealt mainly with the automotive and food sectors. 
 
The speed of harmonization between standards towards a regional standard tends 
to be greater in the case of manufactures than primary goods for two reasons.  The 
first is that agricultural products tend to be traditional sectors where national standards 
have been set time ago, whereas the human-capital-intensive manufacturing sector tends 
to be integrated by more recent industries where firms behave as standard-takers of 
foreign standards (Berlinski 2001).  The second reason is that primary goods are more 
affected by sanitary and phytosanitary concerns than manufactures, which tends to slow 
down the harmonization process.  This is the case for instance in Mercosur, which has 
seen limited harmonization in primary products like meat, seeds and food content. 
 
The speed of standards harmonization is influenced by the similarity in export 
composition between members.  In South-South RTAs like Mercosur and the Andean 
Community where members’ have similar production composition the private sector 
tends to be reticent to harmonize the standards of sensitive sectors for fear of their 
markets being flooded by imports from member countries. In North-North agreements 
like the EU – where members also have similar production composition – the problem is 
smaller since the weight of manufactured products in members’ production is larger and 
                                                 
23 See Decisión 562 Directrices para la elaboración, adopción y aplicación de Reglamentos Técnicos en los 
países miembros de la Comunidad Andina y a nivel comunitario, 25-26 of June 2003, Commission of the 
Andean Community. 
24 This notification system is similar to that of the EU (TRIS), Canada (SCC) and USA (NIST). See 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/sirt .   26
such products have more potential for intra-industry trade than primary goods.  North-
South agreements are less likely to face this type of challenge so long as the North allows 
entry to its protected agricultural sector.  
 
RTAs have allowed members to present a common position in international 
organizations and influence the setting of international standards.  This has been 
particularly the case in the EU and there appears to be some movement in this direction in 
the Andean Community and Mercosur (see Box 4).  The Secretariat of the Andean 
Community is working to establish common positions among its members and provides 
also assistance to its members in the setting of bilateral trade agreements with non-
member countries.  The setting of common positions in international forums is still 
incipient in Mercosur.        
 
 
Box 4: Cooperation between member countries to influence international organizations: the cases of 
Mercosur and the Andean Community. 
 
The Mercosur countries spurred by the spread of SARS influenza recently presented a joint proposal at the 
OMS for a new plan of emergency contention of epidemics and took a leading role in its development.  The 
Mercosur countries regularly participate in the IOE (International Office of Epizoots) through COSAVE 
and have taken common positions on phytosanitary issues. 
 
The Andean Community is working on a joint Andean proposal for the assessment of phytosanitary levels 




Allowing non-members to have a voice in the process of regional harmonization of 
standards allows for the possibility of these countries joining the RTA in the future.  
This was the case with the EFTA countries and the EU and could be the case between 




3.5  CHALLENGES FACED BY RTA STANDARD APPROACHES 
This section presents some of the main challenges faced by Mercosur, Andean 
Community, and ASEAN in the upgrading and harmonizing of their standards and 
conformity assessment procedures. 
 
There is a wide discrepancy between what is signed in a regional standards 
agreement and what is later applied, particularly in RTAs integrated by developing 
countries like Mercosur.  Though Mercosur seems to have made great progress on paper 
in standards cooperation and trade integration, the reality is bleaker.  In spite of its 
apparent progress, a study by the European Central Bank places Mercosur at the same 
level of economic integration as the EU in the 1960-1970s (Dorrucci, Firpo, Fratzscher 
and Mongelli 2002).  Institutional integration in Mercosur is also found to be modest by 
these authors.  It transpired from the interviews performed by the author in Mercosur 
countries that while institutional weaknesses play a role in the great disparity between 
                                                 
25 The main obstacles in the case of Chile are not so much differences in standards, but in tariffs.   27
what is agreed and what is implemented, the main cause appears to be lack of political 
will by governments. 
 
The disparity between members in their economic policies and institutional 
development limits the speed of harmonization of standards and conformity 
assessment procedures.  The lack of harmonization of macroeconomic policies between 
members in the Andean Community and in Mercosur has led to governments going back 
on their promises on standards to protect their markets during crisis.  Lack of 
transparency has allowed customs to reinterpret the meaning of the standard or to delay 
products with all type of pretexts for protectionist reasons.
26  This has had a long-lasting 
effect on Mercosur’s harmonization process as it has led to lasting distrust and 
uncertainty and to firms diverting exports away from conflictive products (Berlinski 
2001).  The extent of institutional disparities between members also affect the speed with 
which an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures can be 
reached, as such agreement requires first the upgrading of the accrediting, testing and 
certifying institutions in those member countries with weaker institutions.  The challenge 
faced by Mercosur and the Andean Community is thus greater than that initially faced by 
the EU as the disparities between members are larger. 
 
There is a lack of transparency in many developing countries in the setting of 
standards and conformity assessment procedures.  Greater transparency increases the 
accountability of government officials and the chances that standards and conformity 
assessment procedures address the needs of the market and of consumers.  It also reduces 
the level of uncertainty for firms, as it improves the transmission of information and 
lessens arbitrary changes in policy.  Greater transparency is a challenge for members in 
Mercosur and the Andean Community, where governments are not accustomed to a high 
degree of transparency in the setting of regulation.  Though the EU, the Andean 
Community, and Mercosur all publish their resolutions in the web, Mercosur is overall 
not as transparent as the Andean Community.  With the exception of Brazil, the other 
Mercosur members do not publish the Mercosur resolutions in their official websites.  
Brazil publishes all of Mercosur’s resolutions in its official bulleting and in its website 
before adopting them and conducts public audiences to which all society is invited to get 
its reactions to the resolutions.  In order to improve the transmission of information to the 
private sector, the Andean Community has created email lists of different groups of firms 
to inform them when WTO or Andean Community members notify a proposed change in 
their standards, so that the firms can send their objections.  The ASEAN community 
overrides the problem of lack of transparency by adopting the clearly stated international 
standards. 
 
Many RTAs start the harmonization process without clear criteria as to what 
standards to prioritize.  This was the case in Mercosur and the Andean Community, 
which started the process with broad and ambitious programs that had later to be refined 
as they were not effective and proved too costly.  In the case of Mercosur, the initial 
harmonization approach tried to cover as many standards as possible and led to an 
                                                 
26 There are claims that at times, when domestic production is threatened by a surge of imports, the 
destination country has delayed the registration of those imported products so as to delay their entry.   28
excessive regulation of technical regulations and voluntary standards at the regional level.  
Harmonization in Mercosur and the Andean Community is now more prioritized focusing 
on those standards that create significant barriers to trade, and regional technical 
regulations are now developed with less detail.  Cooperation between the Mercosur 
Association of voluntary standards (AMN) and the Mercosur Common Group responsible 
for TBT technical regulations (GMC) has also been increased to delimit more clearly the 
coverage of technical regulations and of voluntary standards and reduce overlapping.   
However, the present approach of the Andean Community and Mercosur is still far from 
the EU’s minimalist approach. 
 
Slow harmonization of standards results in outdated standards. Due to the dynamic 
nature of standards, it is essential that regional standards be quickly adopted by member 
countries and be modified accordingly when international standards change due to 
technological changes.  Mercosur’s regional food standards have not incorporated the 
most recent changes in CODEX and this has led to new national standards being used as 
trade barriers, as in the case of some member countries’ labeling standards.  The 
excessive use of ad hoc solutions to problems resulting from the slow adoption of 
regional standards and the lack of mutual recognition of conformity assessments can have 
a similar effect to sporadic restrictions, as they introduce uncertainty which reduces 
exports and increases the costs associated with the minimizing of such uncertainty 
(Berlinski 2001). 
 
Consumers and the private sector in the developing world are not yet aware of the 
importance of standards.  The levels of participation of consumer groups and the 
private sector in the setting of national and regional standards in developing countries are 
still very low.  Unlike in the North, firms do not yet see a standard as an investment to 
remain competitive and absorb foreign technology, but as a protectionist instrument.   
Firms are therefore reticent to pay standardization agencies for the development of a new 
standard.  For instance, honey firms in Uruguay were interested in setting a honey 
standard to prevent intermediaries from paying them a lower price with the excuse that 
the sugar content of the honey is too high or too low.  However, they were not prepared 
to pay the Uruguayan standardization agency UNIT the cost of setting such a standard.  
Consequently, agencies like UNIT in Uruguay or IRAM in Argentina are forced to 
subsidize the setting of voluntary standards with their certification activities.  The low 
participation of local firms in standards setting has two effects: first, a large percentage of 
firms that participate in the setting of standards in Mercosur and the Andean Community 
are foreign owned, and second, standards bodies have greater power in the standards 
setting process than in developed countries.  Both features can lead to standards that do 
not truly reflect the interests of the region.  
 
Small and medium enterprises generally are excluded from the setting of standards 
and cannot afford getting certification or metrology services.  This is due to the 
relatively high representation cost at national committees on voluntary standards and the 
relatively high cost of certification and of metrology tests.  This could translate into 
regional voluntary standards that do not reflect the interests of small and medium 
enterprises and into difficult market access for these type of enterprises, which cannot   29
generally afford getting certified or get their metrology tested.  SEBRAE, a Brazilian 
private institution that provides support services for micro and small enterprises, has 
developed a bold approach at the national level to overcome these problems.  It also 
facilitates access to information on standards and promotes certification and metrology 
awareness across micro and small enterprises to create a larger demand for accreditation 
and certification services and increase the supply of such services across the country.  
SEBRAE also provides “solidarity certification”, which consists of jointly certifying 
groups of small and micro enterprises to reduce certification costs.  It also provides bonds 
that subsidize fifty percent of micro and small enterprises’ expenditure in metrology 
services.   
 
A process of harmonization of standards can be kidnapped by some pressure groups 
and used for protectionist reasons.  This was the case for instance with the 
development of a regional wine standard in Mercosur (see Box 5).  There is the danger 
that protectionist reasons could also shape a future Mercosur bottled water labeling 
standard.  The large bottled water companies in some member countries report on the 
label of the bottles excessive information about the properties of the water (like electrical 
conductivity or temperature of the water at the fountain).  If such information is 
introduced as a requirement in a regional voluntary standard, it could serve as a barrier to 
entry to small bottled water companies (as they cannot bear the costs of such tests) 
reducing competition, which could result in higher prices for consumers.  There is also 
the danger that the process of harmonization be kidnapped by member countries’ 
standards bureaus guided by a principle of institutional self-preservation rather than 




Box 5: The setting of regional standards with protectionist intentions: the case of Mercosur’s wine 
standard. 
 
The Mercosur countries agreed on setting a regional wine standard that forbids the import of wine in 
barrels.  The argument given was that barrels do not preserve the quality of the wine as well as bottles.  The 
real reason was the protection of the wine industries of some Mercosur members.  The wine industry in 
Brazil and Uruguay had lobbied for the creation of such standard to prevent the large entry of better quality 
and cheaper Argentinean wine.  It appears the agreement was reached due in part to the lack of negotiating 
experience of the Argentinean technical committee on wine (Nofal 2004). 
 
 
Mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures is necessary for 
harmonization of standards to effectively reduce barriers to trade.  However, RTAs 
in the developing world are advancing more quickly with the harmonization of standards 
than with the harmonization of conformity assessment procedures.  A possible reason for 
governments’ less enthusiastic approach to harmonization of conformity assessment 
procedures is that it would impede the use of these procedures with protectionist 
intentions.  With the exception of the EU, RTAs are still far form incorporating mutual 
recognition of conformity assessments.   
 
   30
4  A WAY FORWARD 
 
This section suggests principles that could guide developing countries in the regional 
upgrading and harmonizing of their standards and conformity assessment procedures.
27 
 
4.1  SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR THE UPGRADING AND HARMONIZATION OF 
STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
 
There is yet no clear best practice in the upgrading and harmonizing of standards 
and conformity assessment procedures.  However, it is possible to draw some common 
principles from RTAs’ past experiences and existing literature that can serve as guide to 
countries pursuing regional upgrading and harmonization of standards and conformity 
assessment procedures.  These principles are particularly relevant for RTAs integrated by 
developing countries with a low developmental stage and with low technological capacity 
that are seeking to gradually upgrade and harmonize standards at intermediate levels to 
get closer to international standards, rather than set them equal to international standards 
in one go. 
 
1-  Prioritize: A first step is to identify priority sectors for standards reform to keep costs 
low and gather momentum for reforms in other sectors.  The sectors to prioritize are 
those where trade costs arising from differences in standards and conformity 
assessment procedures are higher and where trade between members is larger. 
 
2-  Build trust: Trust between member countries is an important determinant of the 
success of the harmonization of standards and of conformity assessment procedures.  
To build this trust, it is important to have a balanced approach to the reforms so that 
all members perceive that there are gains to be gained from the process by all 
members.   
 
3-  Need for a quality strategy: To keep the reforms focused, it is important that 
regional regulators show that that their proposed regulations will meet the required 
quality before they adopt them.  Regulators could use as a reference the OECD 
Checklist for Regulatory Quality (Jacobs 2004).   
 
Jacobs (2004) identifies five characteristics that are needed for a country to have a 
quality regulatory system.  These characteristics can also be extended to a quality 
regional regulatory system: 
 
1.  Security: predictable enforcement of the rule of law and respect for market 
solutions. 
2.  Transparency: clear and simple rules, openness through the entire policy 
process, and less corruption.  
3.  Legitimacy: must protect consumer safety, health, and the environment. 
                                                 
27 A longer version of this section, which includes suggestions for a more effective and rewarding 
participation of developing countries in the international standards arena, is available on request.   31
4.  Efficiency: low-cost rules, timely decisions, and swift movements to meet 
market needs. 
5.  Expertise: good regulatory skills and understanding of complex markets 
and technologies. 
 
A quality national and regional regulatory system can be strengthened by programs 
promoting awareness among consumers, consumer defense groups and firms of the 
importance of standards to improve quality and safety, to reduce consumer search 
costs, and to increase firms’ market access into higher value added markets. 
 
In establishing regional regulations, it is also important to perform a Regulatory 
Impact Analysis to stimulate consultation with member countries and their societies 
and estimate the costs and benefits of such changes.  The needs of consumers must be 
taken into account even if consumer groups are weak and lack representation in the 
negotiations.  This will help prevent the creation of standards by the private sector 
with protectionist motivations.  It is important to learn from past mistakes and 
successes of previous upgrading and harmonization processes of other RTAs 
(particularly the EU, which is the most advanced in this area) so as to leap frog 
obstacles rather than repeat the past mistakes of others.  Mercosur is not yet doing so, 
as it is still following the old approach of the EU.  There is little knowledge both in 
the Andean Community and in Mercosur of each other’s experiences and of the EU’s 
new approach.  Countries’ should also ensure that national technical committees 
dealing with standards and conformity assessment are not replaced with changes in 
government to avoid the loss of human capital acquired through learning by doing 
and through regional cooperation. 
 
4-  Simplification and dynamism: In the context of limited resources, a simplification 
of the regulation and of the number of standards is a better compromising policy than 
setting a complex system that overburdens the limited capacity of members and 
regional bodies.  While poor and inadequate regulatory structures permit informality 
and corruption, these features are also associated with heavy regulation.  Adapting 
institutions to new roles and functions that serve social and market needs is vital to 
public support for reform.  A simpler regulation makes it easier for regional bodies to 
better represent the interests of its members both in designing regulations and in trade 
agreements with the region’s trading partners.  This simplification includes the 
streamlining of responsibilities of relevant monitoring, certification and enforcement 
agencies; as well as the elimination of overlapping of functions and responsibilities 
between the different state bodies comprising a country’s national standards system.  
Since standards are dynamic by nature, it is important that the harmonization process 
be not only simplified but also made flexible and dynamic so that regional standards 
are suitably modified with changes in technology and level of development.    
 
Developing countries could consider implementing the EU’s principle of minimum 
essential requirements to simplify and speed up the process of standards upgrading.  
Harmonization would be limited to essential requirements, rather than pursuing 
complete harmonization of standards.  There would be a clear distinction between   32
technical regulations and voluntary standards: technical regulations should specify the 
product’s minimum essential requirements and voluntary standards should specify the 
rest of the details in a consistent manner with the essential requirements.  This 
distinction would simplify a region and member countries’ regulatory system – since 
it leads to less overlapping of technical regulations and voluntary standards – and 
reduce information costs for producers – the satisfaction of voluntary standards 
guarantees the satisfaction of technical regulations.
28 This distinction would also 
make the region and members’ regulatory system more dynamic in adapting to 
technological changes.   
 
5-  Gradual reform: A gradual upgrade of regional standards and conformity 
assessment procedures will allow members in a low development stage to better 
adjust to the changes and assimilate their cost.  Furthermore, when the setting of 
higher technical regulations might be slowed down by vested interests, an initial 
measure that can be followed is to make the changes to standards voluntary for a 
selected range of export products.  This permits eager exporters to immediately adopt 
these new standards and achieve greater market access.  This approach is followed in 
Mercosur: when the technical regulation body Common Market Group wants to 
develop a technical regulation in an unregulated product, it first asks the 
standardization agencies to create a voluntary standard.  It later develops a regional 
technical regulation based on the voluntary standard.   
 
6-  Capacity building: Develop a training program for civil servants of member 
countries to capacitate them to implement the necessary standards reforms and 
strengthen the financing, infrastructure and human capital of regional bodies to 
guarantee their effective functioning.  Mercosur for instance is constrained by its 
limited staff numbers and financial resources.  Capacity building can be obtained as a 
component of bilateral trade agreements with partners like the EU (as is the case in 
EU’s agreements with the Andean Community and Mercosur), from ISO’s Five Year 
Action Plan to develop capacity in developing countries and increase national and 
regional cooperation, from the recent WTO fund for technical assistance on standards 
(Calzadilla-Sarmiento 2005) and from donors.  Note however, that the actual services 
need not be only provided by Northern institutions, they can also be provided by 
institutions of developing countries – with financing from donor agencies.  This last 
strategy is attractive because of the advantages of peer evaluation – institutions from 
developing countries are more aware of developing countries’ particular context.   
Such capacitation is already taking place (for example UNIT and INMETRO have 
provided capacitation in many Latin American countries) but there is a need for 
financial aid to extend these services.
29  Brazil submitted a proposal of this nature in 
2001 at the WTO TBT committee, but there has yet been no progress in this area. 
 
                                                 
28 Consequently, producers need not worry about finding out which are the technical regulations that 
address their product – as long as they satisfy the voluntary standards, they will be satisfying the technical 
regulations. 
29 These institutions provide these services with the long run objective of increasing conformity assessment 
capacity in neighboring countries, which would allow eventual mutual recognition and greater trade.   33
7-  Mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures: An upgrading and 
harmonizing of standards will only be effectively translated into greater market 
access if a member country’s conformity assessment procedures are recognized by 
other members.  For mutual recognition to be achieved, member countries need to 
upgrade their certification, accreditation and enforcement capacity to similar levels. 
In addition, this process should include the strengthening of quality inspections at 
borders, ports, and production points, as well as improving regional and national 
infrastructure for transportation and for pack houses to improve delivery quality and 
reduce the number of products rejected for SPS reasons.  One efficient way of 
achieving mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures is to profit from 
economies of scale by setting up accredited regional service providers for testing, 
inspection and certification.  These regional service providers could serve both 
domestic and exporting firms.  This would eliminate the need for double testing and 
would limit the use of conformity assessment with protectionist intentions. 
 
An alternative option would be for members’ bodies to specialize in different 
standards – rather than the respective bodies in a country providing accreditation and 
certification services for all product standards – so as to achieve greater economies of 
scale.  This is what the Andean Community intends in the case of certification 
services under its new approach to mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
(Decisión 506), but is not the case in Mercosur.  It does not make sense for 
developing countries with a small domestic market like Uruguay to have recently 
created an accreditation body (OUA) and for its laboratories to have expertise in the 
certification of all products.  At present Uruguayan laboratories are forced to get 
accredited by the OUA to be able to certify some products although they are already 
accredited by INMETRO from Brazil, an institution of greater accreditation 
recognition.  This increases costs for laboratories in terms of greater accreditation 
fees and more frequent auditing (a process that generally takes two to three days time 
per audit).  
 
Improving the quality of laboratories would also strengthen the capacity to conduct 
risk analysis and other scientific research. These analyses can provide critical 
evidence to boost negotiating capacity at WTO meetings and resolve disputes that 
may arise. 
 
In the absence of an MRA of conformity assessment procedures with extra-regional 
partners, an interesting strategy could be to have inspectors from the extra-regional 
partner at the harbor of origin – this is the case with Japanese inspectors in Ecuador.  
This decreases costs since it is cheaper to have products non-compliant with the 
standards of the destination country rejected at origin rather than at arrival, 
particularly so in the case of perishable goods. 
 
8-  RTAs should also intensify their standards negotiations with other trading 
blocks and countries to achieve greater recognition of each other’s standards and 
conformity assessments and gain greater market access.  Countries should increase 
their disposition to recognize as equivalent other countries’ standards and conformity   34
assessment procedures when they fulfill the same objectives to lower transaction 
costs and increase trade.  However, member countries should take into account their 
RTA standard commitments when setting bilateral agreements with non-RTA 
members to ensure that the agreements are compatible and the integration process is 
not derailed.  At present, Andean Community members are individually setting 
bilateral trade agreements with the US without taking into account their prior regional 
commitments, making more difficult the Andean Community harmonization process.  
In contrast, the forthcoming negotiations with the EU are going to be made at the 
level of the Andean Community and this is likely to strengthen its integration efforts. 
 
 
5  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This paper has provided a first step towards analyzing different regional approaches 
available to developing countries in upgrading their standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, and hopes to stimulate further research in the area.  The main findings of the 
study are: 
 
There are different paths available to upgrade standards. A country can upgrade its 
standards unilaterally or in a coordinated manner, be it a cooperation agreement approach 
or an RTA approach. These paths are not mutually exclusive.  Countries have followed 
differing paths across time and across products.  The suitability of the different paths for 
a developing country depends on the country’s level of development, the institutional 
type of agreement and the product concerned.   
 
Upgrading standards and conformity assessment procedures unilaterally to 
international levels is the simplest process.  In products where international standards 
are commonly accepted and the country’s production structure is sufficiently developed, 
upgrading unilaterally to international standards would be advisable as it leads to greater 
market access both intra-regionally and extra-regionally.  However, this strategy might 
prove costly for products where satisfaction of international standards does not guarantee 
market access, since the costs of restructuring production to such high standards might 
outweigh the benefits.  It might also not be a suitable strategy for those countries that do 
not wish to equate their standards to international standards for a particular product or 
products because their technological level or their health, security and environment 
objectives are not aligned with international standards.  In both cases, a coordinated path 
is particularly appealing as it guarantees greater market access if a standard level is 
reached and it allows for the possibility of countries gradually upgrading towards 
international standards. 
 
The particular coordinated path followed by a developing country depends on the 
institutional sophistication of the trade agreement.  A cooperative agreement approach 
(such as that of APEC or of bilateral trade agreements) has less enforcement power than 
an RTA approach, and can therefore encounter greater obstacles if some members are not 
fully committed to the upgrading process.  However, there are some sectors like the 
technological sector and some areas like metrology where there is stronger willingness to 
upgrade because of their high returns and smaller potential adverse effects – and thus the   35
smaller need for enforcement.  In these sectors and areas a cooperative agreement 
approach can be a promising venue for standards and conformity assessment upgrading.  
In sectors where there are clear winners and losers to harmonization, cooperation without 
strong enforcement can be more difficult to achieve.  Low tariffs could diminish the 
potential problem of tariffs being used for protection once standards are harmonized 
under a cooperative agreement approach. 
 
An RTA approach involves not only the upgrading of standards, but also the 
regional harmonization of standards.  In the case of an RTA approach like ASEAN the 
harmonization is set at the level of the international standards.  This saves resources since 
regional standards bodies are not needed.  However, the cost of setting standards at the 
international level might be too costly for an RTA if the member countries’ technological 
development and their health and safety objectives are very different to OECD countries, 
which are the countries that generally set the international standards.  In such RTAs, 
harmonizing regionally at intermediate standards levels and gradually upgrading 
standards towards international standards, as Mercosur and the Andean Community are 
doing, might be a more suitable option. 
 
A country can combine different paths for different products.  If a developing 
country has higher standards than the other RTA member countries in a particular 
product and it has a sufficiently developed institutional framework, it can unilaterally 
raise its standard for that product to the international standard.  So long as the country 
accepts entry of products satisfying the regional standard and so long as the satisfaction 
of the higher international standard allows for the satisfaction of the regional standard, 
the RTA approach is compatible with the unilateral approach.  The country can therefore 
gain both greater intra-regional and extra-regional market access in that product.   
Similarly, the RTA approach can be compatible with a simultaneous cooperative 
agreement approach with other non-member countries so long as the country’s standards 
undergo a gradual upgrading process towards the international standards consistent with 
the cooperative approach.   
 
To date, RTAs in the developing world have not begun to realize their full potential 
for overcoming standards related obstacles to regional or global trade.  Countries 
need to speed up and more effectively implement their upgrading and harmonization 
efforts to achieve greater returns in terms of market access and to better meet their health 
and environment objectives.  
 
Developing countries have a much lower participation rate in international standard 
organizations (ISO, IEC, TBT and SPS) than developed countries members of RTAs.  
While developing countries  
 
make up 73 percent of ISO membership, they still hold only 5 percent of the 
secretariat positions.  Increasing their participation would allow developing 
countries to have a greater say in ensuring that international standards reflect 
their needs (Hufbauer, Kotschwar and Wilson 2001:8). 
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The main reason for this low participation is the high cost of representation and the lack 
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